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Since the famous Ju Toy Case in America and the equally famous
Arlidge Case in England, there has been considerable apprehension
that administrative law, as it is being developed, is gradually encroach-
ing upon a fundamental safeguard of the liberty and property protected
in England by "the rule of "law"3 and in America by the due process
clauses of the Constitution.4 From an inarticulate training or perhaps
from intuition the average Anglo-American had apparently come to feel
that the fundamental law of the land requires some sort of judicial
review of those administrative determinations which seriously affect
one's rights with respect to liberty and property. When, therefore, he
was told by the courts that one's most important rights with respect
to liberty and property may, under some circumstances, be determined
by administrative officers without any right of judicial review, or with
a very limited'right of review, he was instinctively inclined to be some-
what apprehensive.5 Within the last year, however, the United States
Supreme Court, partly perhaps as -a result of this apprehension, has
handed down a highly important decision" in which the Court practically
eliminated the margin of finality which had apparently been accorded
.1 United States v. Ju. Toy (19o5) i98 U. S. 253, 25 Sup. Ct. 644.
'Local Goverment Board v.-Arlildge [I9IS-r, H. L.] A. C. i2o.
'As to the protection secured by the so-called "rule 'of law" see Dicey, The
Law of the Constitution (7th ed. igo8) I79 ff. See in this connection an inter-
esting discussion of the Arlidge Case by Professor Dicey, The Development of
Admiistrative Law in England (I915) 31 LAW QUAR. REV. 148.
""No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law." U. S. Const. 5th Amendment. The 14th Amendment
imposes the requirement of due process upon the several states. And there
are similar provisions in the various state constitutions.
In order to avoid any misinterpretation of the context it may be well to add
that the principles of due process, as understood in America, are in general
applicable to English tribunals not proceeding according to express authority
of Parliament. "And, of- course, the general principles of "the rule of law"
apply, under one name or another, in the United States as well as in England.
"Some commentators have even expressed a fear that the un-Anglican droit
adininistratif has already found a formidable footing in Anglo-American law.
See Hannis Taylor, Due Process of Law (i915) 24 YALE LAW JOURNA1, 353, 369.
Mr. Taylor there says: "Droit administratif has no right to exist in a country in
which there is due process of law or the law of the land. . . . [But] under
the fatal exception to the law of the land born of a lamentable misapprehension
in Murraiy v. Hoboken Land & Improve'ment Company [(i855, U. S.) 18 How.
272] we are rapidly building up a droit administratif in the United States.'
See also Dicey, op. cit. (915) 31 LAW QuAil. REv. x48.




to the most important class of administrative determinations, viz.,
administrative valuations for purposes of rate regulation.
In that case the Supreme Court held, in effect, that, where there has
been a valuation by a public service commission for rate-making pur-
poses, due process requires a right to an -independent judicial re-exam-
ination of the administrative valuation.. The facts of the case were as
follows: A state public service commission after due notice and hearing
fixed the value of a public utility for rate-making purposes. The
utility appealed to the superior court of the state on the ground that the
value as fixed was so low that the commission's action deprived the
utility of property without due process. There was no claim of want
of jurisdiction orabuse of discretion. The superior court passed upon
the weight of the evidence and corrected the valuation.7 The supreme
court of the state, reversing the superior court and reinstating the order
of the commission, held that as there was competent evidence tending
to sustain the commission's valuation and as no abuse of discretion
appeared, the commission's valuation should be considered final." The
United States Supreme Court, reversing the supreme court of the state,
held that, since the state public service act, as construed by the supreme
court of the state, did not permit a judicial review in which the review-ing court could exercise its independent judgment as to the valuation of
the utility, it violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Justices Brandeis, Holmes, and Clarke dissented on the ground,
.inter alia, that, in this respect, due process requires no more than a
review of the question "whether there was evidence on which the
"iraluation adopted could reasonably have been made."
The question, then, is: To what extent, if any, does due process
require a judicial review of administrative valuations, particularly
administrative valuations for purposes of rate regulation? In -order
to. answer this question adequately it will first be necessary to deter-
mine the precise nature of the action of a public service commission
in making such a determination. Is such action legislative, executive,
or judicial? Or is it a practical union of these so-called "three powers"
of government-a sort of "fourth power?"O It does not aid us much
to call it, as it is commonly called, "administrative" action.
For the sake of argument let us assume that due process requires ajudicial determination of the question of proper valuation for purposes
of rate regulation. It by no means follows that there must be a judicial
review of-a valuation made by a public service commission; for, accord-
7Ben'Avon Borough v. Ohio Valley Water Co. (917) 68 Pa. Super. Ct. 561.
'Ben Avon Borough et al. v. Ohio Valley Water Co. (Nio. 1) (1918) 26o Pa.
289, lO3 Atl. 75o.
'See Edward A. Harriman, The Development of Administrative Law in theUnited States (1916) 25 YA=n LAw jouRxAL, 658, 659: "From the standpoint
of the function which they perform, there are four kinds of officers, and notthree, and the administrative function supplements the executive, legislative
and judicial functions."
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ing to the better view, the modern public service commission acts
judicially,10 as well as legislatively and executivelyY- But does such
a commission act judicially when, in making a valuation for rate-making
purposes, it determines that the rate which it bases on such valuation
is a reasonable and, therefore, nion-confiscatory rate?
The United States Supreme Court held in the well-known Prentis
Case1 2 that such action is not judicial action. But can such a holding
be supported? If, after a commission has fixed a rate, a court is
called upon to determine whether the rate is reasonable (i. e., whether
the rate permits the utility to earn a reasonable return upon the fair
value of its property), it is well settied today that such a determination
involves judicial action." So, if a commission after fixing a rate were
empowered to make such a determination, it would clearly be a judicial
determination. Now, if such a subsequent determination of 'that
question is judicial action, why is not a contemporaneous determination
of that question just as much judicial action? In each case there are
contesting parties, there is due notice and a hearing substantially the
same as .in an ordinary court trial, and in each case the object is, in
practical effect, to determine the jural relations" of contestants as they
10 See e.g., Interstate Commerce Commission v. Cincinnati etc. Ry. Co. (i897)
167 U. S. 479, 501, 17 Sup. Ct 896, where the Supreme Court, speaking with
reference to the power granted to. the Interstate Commerce C6mmission, said:
"The power given is partly judicial." See an article by A. A. Berle, Jr., entitled
The Expansion of American Administrative Law (1917) 3o HAv. -L. REv. 430,
in which this point is discussed.
'The doctrine of the separation of powers does not prevent such a union of
powers, for that doctrine applies only "so far as the requirements of efficient
administration will permit." See 2 Willoughby, Constitution (igio) secs. 739,
742. And it would be utterly impractical to apply the doctrine to such special
governmental machinery as the commissions which modern conditions have made
necessary for an efficient administration of present-day governmental activities.
The doctrine was engrafted into our law when nearly all governmental action
was taken by the general gov.ernmental machinery which at that time was, in
the main, adequate for the demands of the times. Since that time, however,
and particularly within the last few decades, governmental action has been
extended over a vast field which it had hitherto been supposed was beyond the
reach of governmental interference. As a result we today have numerous
commissions dealing with many great problems like those involved in rate
regulation. It was inevitable of course that such an evolution should effect a
-change in the judicial process. It was impossible for the general governmental
machinery to take much of the governmental action demanded by the times; and
it would be impractical to the point of utter inefficiency to limit the action of
these commissions so as to exclude many functions precisely like those exercised
by the courts. Consequently these commissions today actually exercise numer-
ous judicial functions. See A. A. Berle Jr., op. cit. note io.
"Frentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co. (1908) 211 U. S. 2io, 2 Sup. Ct. 67.
Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. (1894) 154 U. S. 362, 14 Sup. Ct. io62.
But see Munn v. Illinois (1876) 94 U. S. 113, as to an earlier view.
1" See Corbin, Jural Relations and their Classification (i921) 30 YALE LAW
JOURNAL, 226. Cf. Kocourek, Various Definitions of Jural Relations (Ig2o) 2o
Cor. L. Rxv. 394.
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stand on present or past facts. Can this mere change in time of action,
then, change the nature of the action?
In holding that it does and that, therefore, such action is not judicial
action, the United States Supreme Court, per Mr. Justice Holmes,
reasoned as follows :15 The final act of fixing a rate, considered as an
isolated act, is a legislative act, and
"The nature of the final act determines the nature of the previous
inquiry. . . So, when the final act is legislative, the decision whichinduces it cannot be judicial in the practical sense, although the ques-
tions considered might be the same that would arise in the trial of a
case."'
6
With great deference it is submitted that this reasoning is erroneous.
In the first place it seems unsound to lay it down dogmatically that "the
"nature of the final act determines the nature of the previous inquiry."
The fallacy may be illustrated as follows: A public service commission
is often empowered to establish reasonable rates if (in the ordinary
administrative proceeding) it finds that the rate fixed by the utility is
not a reasonable rate. Suppose, then, that in an ordinary proceeding
such a commission, after due notice and hearing, passes upon the
reasonableness of a rate fixed by the utility and decides that the rate is
reasonable. Here the final act of the commission is clearly judicial,
for the courts have always passed upon the reasonableness of rates fixed
by a public utility.Y7 Hence, by the reasoning of the Supremfe Court,
the whole action of the commission is judicial.
Suppose, now, that iti such a proceeding a commission, after finding
that the rate fixed by the utility is a reasonable rate, then (with statu-
tory authority) establishes that rate as the rate to be hereafter charged.
Here the final act of the commission is legislative, for it lays down a
rule for the future.'8 Hence by the reasoning of the Supreme Court
the whole proceeding of the commission becomes legislative, so that the
determination by the commission that the rafe fixed by the utility is
reasonable is a legislative determination. In each case, however, the
actual nature of the action of the commission in finding that the rate
is reasonable is precisely the same sort of action in precisely the same
sort of proceeding. It defies analysis, therefore, to say that the deter-
mination of the reasonableness of such a rate is in the one case judicial
and in the other legislative. Ex rerum natura it would seem that the
nature of action depends upon an analysis of the action at the time when
'-PrentLs v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., supra note 12. l Id., at p. 227.
17 "It has always been recognized that, if a carrier attempted to chargea shipper
an unreasonable sum, the courts had jurisdiction to inquire into that matter ...
Nor [is] the limit of judicial inquiry altered, because the legislature instead of
the carrier prescribes the rates." Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., supra
note 13, at p. 397.
""The establishment of a rate is the making of a rule for the future, and
therefore is an act legislative not judicial in kind." Per Mr.-Justice Holmes in
Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., supra note 12, at p. 226.
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its nature is called in question. It is submitted, therefore, that the
question whether such action is legislative, executive, of judicial
depends rather upon an analysis of the action at the-time of the action
than upon the nature of the subsequent action, if any, of -the actor.
In the second place, the learned justice says that the commission's
determination -of' the reasonableness of the rate which it contempora-
neously establishes "cannot be judicial in the practical sense, although
"the questions considered might be the same that would arise in the
"trial of a case [in court]." But why? Whatever may be judicial in
the sense in which the word judicial was used before anyone ever
thought of conferring upon commissions the extensive powers now
exercised by them, is not such action, to use the learned Justice's own
phrase, "judicial in the practical sense"? As has been well said, this is
a practical age, and it demands not only practical decisions but practical
reasons to support them.
What action, then, is "judicial in the practical sense"? Mr. Justice
Holmes, speaking for the court in the Prentis Case, answered the
question as follows: i
"A judicial inquiry investigates, declares and enforces liabilities as
they stand on present or past facts and under laws supposed already to
exist."
Of course, if that definition of judicial action is literally accurate,
it is difficult, if not impossible, to hold that such a determination as the
one in question involves an exercise of judicial power. It seems clear,
however, that the definition just quoted does not cover all cases. Sup-
pose, for example, that a novel case arises in a common-law court,
There is no statute on "the question. The court must decide the case.
The court, therefore, actually makes the law for that case; it does not,
within Mr. Justice Holmes' definition, act "under laws supposed already
"to exist." Of course, there are many who 9till say that a judge in
.such a case simply declares a preexisting law, but that theory is clearly
fiction and should be discarded. Yet all agree that the action of a
court in such a case is judicial action. Hence, in order to have judicial
action it is not necessary that there should be, in point, a "law supposed
"'already to exist."
The practical difference between: judicial and legislative action is
that the former determines the 'jural relations' 20 of contestants "as
"they stand on present or past facts," while the latter declares, rules for
the future.2' Therefore, without attempting any all-comprehensive
Ibid. 20 See note 14 supra.
"As Mr. Justice Field said in a dissenting opinion in the Sinking Fund Cases
(1878) 99 U. S. 7oo, 761: "The distinction between a judicial and a legislative
act is well defined. The one determines what the -law is and what the rights
of parties are, with reference to transactions already had; the other prescribes
what the -law shall be in future cases arising under it. Wherever an act under-
-takes to determine a question of right or obligation, or of property, as- the
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definition of judicial action, it is sufficient for present purposes to say
that, since, as already shown, there may be judicial action before there
is any "law" in existence in regard to the question, it would seem that,
as the actiorn in question, if taken by the commission after the rate is
fixed, is indisputably judicial action, its nature cannot be changed
merely because the action was taken in an earlier part of the commis-
sion's proceeding. For the purpose of determining the nature of such
action it is immaterial in what stage of the proceeding such action is
taken, for, at Whatever stage this action is taken, there are contesting
parties before the tribunal and the tribunal is, "in a practical sense,"
determining the jural relations of contestants "as they stand on present
"or past facts." Hence, with Mr. Chief Justice Fuller in his dissenting
opinion in the Prentis Case, 22
"I cannot see why the reasonableness and justness of a rate may not
be judicially inquired into and judicially determined at the time of the
fixing of the rate, as well as afterwards."
If such a determination cannot be judicial, it is because of a distinction
too subtle to be called "practical." It is submitted, therefore, that the
modern public service commission in making a valuation and basing a
rate thereon has contemporaneously made a judicial determination that
the rate is reasonable and, therefore, non-confiscatory. Hence the
question reduces itself to this: Does due process require a judicial
review of such a judicial determination; and, if so, to what extent?
In the first case in point the United States Supreme Court held that
due process requires a judicial review, but the Court did not declare
the extent of the required review.23 In that case, however, which arose
before commissions' functions were so extensive as at present, the Court
proceeded on the theory that the action of the particular commission
in fixing the rate was without semblance of due process, there being no
notice or hearing.2 ' On that theory the Court was clearly correct in
foundation upon which it proceeds, such act is to that extent a judicial one, and
not the proper exercise of. legislative ,functions." See adopting this distinction
2 Willoughby, op. cit. note ii, sec. 744. See also Cooley, Constitutional Limita-
tions (7 ed. 19o3) 132, 133, 134.
"'Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line'Co., supra note 12, at p. 237.
' Chicago. Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Minnesota (i8go) 134 U. S. 418,
io Sup. Ct 462, 702.
"Said the court (at p. 457) : "No hearing is provided for [by the statute as
construed by the supreme court of the state], no summons or notice to the
company before the commission'has found what it is to find and declared what
it is to declare, no opportunit provided for the company .o introduce witnesses
before the commission, in fact, nothing which has the semblance of due process
of law; and although, in the present case, it appears that, prior to the decision
of the commission, the company appeared before it by its agent, and the com-
mission investigated the rates charged by the company for transporting milk,
yet it does not appear what the character of the investigation was or how the
result was arrived at."
The statute, however, provided for a hearing* before the commission. Minn.
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holding that the statute, in making such administrative action final, had
deprived the utility of property without due process. The case, there-
fore, is not a good -precedent for the proposition that due process
requires an independent judicial review of the administrative determi-
nations of a modem public service commission, for the modem public
service commission acts after due notice and hearing; and, in many
respects, its proceedings are in a practical sense judicial proceedings.
The courts in citing that case, however, have apparently failed to give
due consideration to this fLndamental change in the proceedings of such
commissions.
The later cases, so far as they totich upon the problem have, in the
main, confined themselves to such indefinite generalizations as that
"the right to a judicial review [under the due process clause] must be
"substantial, adequate, and safely available." 25
Although-the Supreme Court, prior to the principal case, had never
attempted to elucidate the extent to which due process requires a judi-
cial review in rate regulation the Court had frequently used language
which, apparently at least, is in accord with the dissent in the principal
case. For example, in a rate case, much relied upon by the supreme
court of the state to support the finding of the commission's valuation
in the principal case, the United States Supreme Court said :26
"Its [the commission's] conclusion, of course, is subject to review, but,
when supported by evidence, is accepted as fiAal; not that its decision,
involving, as it does, so many and such vast public interests, can be
supported by a mere scintilla of proof, but the courts will not examine
the facts further than to determine whether there was substantial
evidence to sustain the order."
In the case just quoted from, however, there was no contention that
the rate as fixed by the commission deprived the utility of any consti-
tutional right. Now it needs no argument to show that in respect to
the extent of required judicial review there is an essential difference
between rate cases in which there is a claim of a violation of a constitu-
tional right and rate cases in which -there is no such claim. .Hence, we
may briefly dismiss tho~e cases, like the case last quoted from, in which
the courts, in the absence of a constitutional claim, have held that they
would not review administrative determinations of fact further than to
ascertain whether there was sfibstantial evidence to sustain the commis-
sion's decision. Those cases do not involve due process or any other
constitutional requirement. Courts and commentators, however, have
commonly failed to distinguish carefully between these two classes of
Gen. Laws i887, ch. io, sec. 9 (f). But the United States Supreme Court,
accepting the construction placed upon the statute by the supreme court of the
state, ignored this provision.
' Wadley Southern Ry. v. Georgia (1915) 235 U. S. 65I, 66i, 35 Sup. Ct. 214,
218.
'4 Interstate Commerce Commission v. Union Pacific R. R. Co. (i912) 222 U. S.
541, 547, 32 Sup. Ct. 1o8, 1i.
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cases, with the result that we find it laid down in the leading text-book
on rate regulation that
"A fundamental function of the Commission is to make findings of
fact in the cases which come before it. Whether a rate is reasonable
• . . [and similar enumerated questions] are questions of fact, which
are peculiarly within the province of the Commission . .. When
based upon evidence, the Commission's determinations of facts are
conclusive and will not be reexamined in the courts.127
Now, of course, if the statement just quoted is correct in regard: to
both classes of cases, then the decision ih the principal case is clearly
erroneous; for it is indisputable that the determination of the value of
a public utility is a determination of a question of fact. However,
the cases cited to support the proposition are largely cases in which
the court was discussing the administrative determination of a disputed
fact, such as "an essential jurisdictional fact," where there was no
contention that the determination deprived the utility of some constitu-
tional right.2 s Indeed it seems that-where a public service commission
is alleged to have violated a constitutional right by a rate regulation,
the Supreme Court has never held that "the courts will not examine
"the facts further than to determine whether there was substantial
"evidence to sustain the [cominission's] order."
In analogous cases, however, the Supreme Court has taken that view.
For example, in Ne&i York and Queens Gas Co. v. McCall,29 decided
in 1917, the Supreme Court took that view in regard to an order of a
public service commission which required a public utility to extend its
lines into new territory. In that case it was contended that such exten-
sion would not produce an adequate return and that, therefore, the
extension order deprived the utility of property without due process.
But the Court, after reviewing the cases, said :30
"It is the result of these and similar decisions that . . this court.
will not analyze .or balance the evidence which was before the Commis-
sion for the purpose of determining whether it preponderates for or
against the conclusion arrived at, yet it will, nevertheless, enter upon
such an examination of the record as may be necessary to determine
whether ihe federal constitutional right claimed has been denied, as,
in this case, whether there was sueh a want of hearing or such arbitrgry
or capricious action on the part of the Commission as to violate the
due-process clause of the Constitution."
... . Weagree with the Court of Appeals of New York in conclud-
ing that the action of the Commission complained of was not arbitrary
or capricious, but was based on very substantial evidence, and therefore
that, even if the courts differed with the Commission as to the expe-
diency or wisdom of the order, they are without authority to substitute
for its judgment their views of what may be reasonable or wise."
'Beale .& Wyman, Railroad Rate Regulation (2d ed. 1915) sec. 1134.
'One of the cases cited to support this proposition is Interstate Commerce
Commission v. Union Pacific R. R. Co., supra note 26, already discussed in the
body of this article.
S(97) 245 U. S. 345, 38 Sup. Ct. 122. "Id. at pp. 348, 351.
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Though this is a holding in regard to an extension order and not in
regard to a rate order, it would seem that there is, with respect to our
present problem, no difference in principle between rate cases and
extension cases. In each case an order of the same commission in
precisely the same sort of proceeding is alleged to have deprived the
utility of properr without due process. It does not justify the differ-
ence in the decisions to say that the doctrine of stare decisis does not
rigidly apply to due process cases-that what is due process in one case
is not necessarily due process in another case. It may be that the line
of demarcation between what is and what is not due process must be
pricked out by the "process of judicial inclusion and exclusion. ' "
Yet the fundamental principles underlying due process should certainly
be applied similarly in similar cases unless there is a very good reason
to the contrary.
Is there, then, any good reason for applying these principles differ-
ently in rate cases? In this connection it must be remembered that a
public service commission, through its special training or experience, is
an expert body.3 2 It is specially designed and equipped to deal with a
limited class of questions. It therefore has (theoretically -at least)
greater skill than the ordinary courts in dealing with the special
questions within its limited jurisdiction. In short, the ordinary court
is, so to speak, a sort of general practitioner; the commission is a
specialist. It would seem, therefore, that a court, unless unmistakably
required by the Constitution to do otherwise, should accord a wide
margin of finality fa the deliberate dpterminations of a body of special-
ists authorized by law to make such determinations. Does the Consti-
tution, then, unmistakabl; prohibit such a margin of finality?
In arriving at the answer to that question it is necessary to bear in
mind some of the fundamental conceptions underlying due process.
In the first place it must be remembered that "due process is not
"necessarily judicial process ;,, that legislative, executive, or adminis-
trative process may be due process; and that the right of appeal to a
court is not in all cases an essential of due process.34 Hence, even if the
action of the commission in contemporaneously determining the reason-
ableness of the rate it establishes is not judicial process, it does not
follow that the commission's determination is .not due process or that
there must necessarily.be a right of appeal to the courts.' Furthermore,
it must be remembered that the requirement of due process is not
"
1 Davidson, v. New Orleans (877) 96 U. S. 97, 1o4; Twining v. State of New
Jersey (9o8) 211 U. S. 78, 100, 29 Sup. Ct. 14, 20.
32Peope ex rel. New York & Queens Gas Co. v. McCall (i916) 229 N. Y. 84,
113 N. E. 795, affirmed, and approved on this point, by the United States Supreme
Court in New York & Queens Gas Co. v. McCall, supra note 29. See Beale.&
Wyman, op. cit. note 27, sec. 1134.
33Reetz v. Michigan (19o3) 188 U. S. 505, 507, 23 Sup. Ct. 390, 391 ; Murray's
Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co. (1855, U. S.) 18 How. 272; David-
son v. New Orleans, supra note 32.
'Pittsburg etc. Ry. Co. v. Backus (1894) 154 U. S. 421, 14 Sup. Ct. 2124.
See also cases cited in note 33. See 2 Willoughby, op. cit. note ix, sec. 463.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
necessarily a requirement that justice be accomplished; it is primarily
a requirement that appropriate machinery be used for accomplishing
justice.3 5 And, as already explained, a highly specialized commission
is a more appropriate machine than a general court for determining the
special questions within its limited jurisdiction. Finally, the due
process clause, like the Constitution of which it is a part, is, according to
the better view, not a rigid, inelastic conception, but a living embodi-
ment of supposedly fundamental principles which must be always
applicable to the ever-changing conditions of society.38 As one of the
greatest of living judges once expressed it, the due process clause was
not intended to perpetuate any "particular [social or] economic
"theory." 37 Therefore, what was due process yesterday is not neces-
sarily due process today; for to hold otherwise would, in the language
of the Supreme Court, "stamp upon our jurisprudence the unchange-
ableness attributed to the laws of the Medes and Persians."38s  In otler
words, even if a given determination of the commission has not been
hitherto considered due -process, it does not follow that it is not due
process today. Indeed it is impossible to follow the trend of judicial
opinion without coming to -the conclusion recently expressed by one
writer as follows :30
"Most high courts have refused to regard constitutions as codes, and
of late years have more and more made due process of law whatever
process seems due to the demands of the times, as understood by thejudges of the time being."
Can-it, then, be said that "the demands of the times" require that
due process in rate valuations shall be a process in which there are not
only due notice and a hearing in a proceeding judicial in nature (a
proceeding specially designed for rate purposes), but also a right to an
independent re-examination of the valuation by an ordinary court?
Rather it would seem that the demands of the times require that thejudicial tribunals should more and more accord a wide margin of
finality to such administrative determinations. The United States
Supreme Court and other courts have accorded this margin of finality
to administrative valuatioiis for purposes of condemnation, 0 and for
'Cf. Davidson v. New Orleans, supra note 31, at p. lo5: "It is not possible to
hold that a party has, without due process of law, been deprived of his property,
when, as regards the issues affecting, it, he has, by the laws of the state, a fair
trial in a court of justice, according to the modes of proceeding applicable to such
a case."
'See a discussion of this point by Charles M. Hough, Due Process of Law-
Today (1919) 32 HAzv. L. RFv. 218.
Holmes, J., dissenting in Lochner v. New York (19o5) 198 U. S. 45, 75, 25
Sup. Ct. 539, 547: "A Constitution is not intended to embody a particular econo-
mic theory, whether of paternalism and the organic relation of the citizen to the
state or of laissez faire. It is made for people of fundamentally diffeiing views."
.Hurtado v. California (1884) iO U. S. 516, 529, 4 Sup. Ct. II, 117.
"Charles M. Hough, op. cit. note 36, at p. 233.
"Long Island Water Supply Co. v. Brooklyn (1897) 166 U. S. 685, 17 Sup. Ct.
718. See 2 Lewis, Eminent Domain (3d ed. 19o9) sec. 88, and authorities therein
cited.
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purposes of taxation.4 ' Why should they not accord it to valuations
for purposes of rate regulation? In a taxation case 2 in which there
was a claim that the administrative valuation was unconstitutional, the
United States Supreme Court held that it would not review such
valuation further than to ascertain whether there was "fraud or a clear
adoption of a fundamentally wrong principle."'  And in a condemna-
tion case 44 in which there was likewise a claim that the administrative
valuation was a denial of due process the Supreme Court used the
following significant language:
"It may be true, as contended, that, as construed by the Court of
Appeals, the determination of the commissioners is conclusive as to
the mere value of the property, but there is no denial of due process in
making the findings of fact by the triers of fact, whether commissioners
or a jury, final as..to such facts, and leaving open to the courts simply
the inquiry as to whether there was any erroneous basis adopted by the
triers in their appraisal, or other .errors in their proceedings.""4
Moreover, as we have seen, the Supreme Court accords this margin
of finality tb other administrative detdrminations than dondemnation-
valuations and taxation valuations, and that, too, even where there
is a claim that the administrative determination is a violation of due
process. 6
It is submitted, therefore, that the well-established view as to these
analogous determinations, particularly as to taxation valuations and
condemnation valuations, should be applied to rate valuations. In
regard to all three valuations the owner's property is affected in sub-
stantialy the same way, i. e., is actually "taken" by process of law;
in regard to all three the administrative tribunal is simply determining a
question of fact, viz., the value of the property, though, of course, the
basis of the valuation may be different in the different classes of cases,
e. g., market value in condemnation cases, and so-called "present value"
in rate cases.
The very reason for creating commissions to make such determina-
tions is that the efficient administration of government requires that
such determinations be made by special tribunals as distinguished from
the genergl governmental machinery. Hence, in regard to all three
'Pittsburg, Cincinnati, etc. Ry. Co. v. Backus (1894) supra note 34. See 1
Cooley, Taxation (3d ed. 89o3) 64, 65 and authorities there cited.
' Chicago B. & Q. Ry. Co. v. Babcock (I9O7). o4 U. S. 585, 27 Sup. Ct 326.
aId. at p. 596.
"Long Island Water Supply Co. v. Brooklyn, supra note 4o.
' Id. at p. 695.
-"See, e.g., New York & Queens Gas Co. v. McCall, supra note 29. See Hall,
Cases on Constitutional Law (1913) 288, where there is an extended citation
of authorities to support this statement: "In respect to controversies arising out
of the administration of law on behalf of the public, not involving the punishment
of offenses, due process of law is afforded, in the absence of fraud or other
manifest abuse of authority, by submitting to an administrative tribunal the
final determination of facts, after a fair hearing."
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valuations, and indeed in regard to all analogous determinations, it
would seem that the practical- requirements of efficient government
should furnish the basis of the extent to which -the courts, under the
requirements of due process, should review such so-called "adminis-
trative" action.4
7
The basic idea underlying the modern conception of due process
with respect to deliberate legislative action seems to be that such action
(at any rate if undelegated action) should not be held to violate due
process, "unless, [as Mr. Justice Holmes once observed] 48 it can be
"said that a rational and fair man" would "admit" that such action
"would infringe! fundamental principles as they have been understood
"by the traditions of our people and our law."45  Now, the final act of
fixing a rate is deliberate legislative action. Why, therefore, apply. a
different theory to such action when expressly authorized by the
legislature and taken by a legislative agency which is admittedly more
competent than the legislature itself to take such action? The United
States Supreme Court has said with reference to such a legislative
agency that its findings should be treated with the respect "due to the
"judgment of a tribunal appointed by law and informed by expe-
"rience."5 ° Hence, in declaring unconstitutional the deliberate action
of such a tribunal it would seem that the courts should proceed with the
utmost caution and with almost meticulous regard for-the opinion of the
commission. 51 There is no reason why we should not go the length
contended for by many courts and commentators with respect to tndele-
gated legislative action, and say that deliberate "administrative" action
should not be declared unconstitutional u~less it is shown to be so
"beyond a reasonable doubt. '52 At any rate, in view of the foregoing
observations, especially in view of the decisions as to the finality of
analogous administrative determinations, it is submitted that, when a
public service commission acting within its jurisdiction and after due
notice and hearing makes a valuation for purposes of rate regulation,
nothing short of arbitrary action on the part of the commission or a
clear adoptioi of a fundamentally wrong principle should be held to
be such an infringement of a fundamental of the social order as to
constitute a denial of due process.
'See 2 Willoughby, op. cit. note ii, sec. 754.
"In his dissenting opinion in Lochner v. New York, supra note 37, at p. 76.
See Albert M. Kales, "Due Process," the Inarticulate Major Premise and the
AdamsonAct (1917) 26 YALE LAw JOURNAL, 519; Charles M. Hough, 6p. cit.
note 36, at pp. 232, 233.
580 llinois Central etc. R. R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission. (i9o7)
2o6 U. S. 44r, 454, 27 Sup. Ct. 7oo, 704.
" Cf. Darnell v. Edwards (1917) 244 U. S. 564, 569, 37 Sup. Ct. 701, 703, where
the court says: "It is well established that in a question of rate-making there is
a strong presumption in favor of the conclusions reached by an experienced
administrative body after a full hearing."
See, e. g., the Sinking Fund Cases, supra note 21, at p. 718: "beyond a rational
doubt." See James B. Thayer, The Origin, and Scope of the American Doctrine
of Constitutional Law (1893) 7 HAsv. L. REv. 129, 139-142.
